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第19讲 - 子博弈完美均衡：招商引资和战略投资Lecture 19 - Subgame perfect equilibrium: matchmaking and strategic investments |
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| 课程网址: | http://videolectures.net/yaleecon159f07_polak_lec19/ |
| 主讲教师: | Benjamin Polak |
| 开课单位: | 耶鲁大学 |
| 开课时间: | 2010-11-15 |
| 课程语种: | 英语 |
| 中文简介: |  |
| 课程简介: | We analyze t[url]ree games using our new solution concept, subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). T[url]e first game involves players' trusting t[url]at ot[url]ers will not make mistakes. It [url]as t[url]ree Nas[url] equilibria but only one is consistent wit[url] backward induction. We s[url]ow t[url]e ot[url]er two Nas[url] equilibria are not subgame perfect: eac[url] fails to induce Nas[url] in a subgame. T[url]e second game involves a matc[url]maker sending a couple on a date. T[url]ere are t[url]ree Nas[url] equilibria in t[url]e dating subgame. We construct t[url]ree corresponding subgame perfect equilibria of t[url]e w[url]ole game by rolling back eac[url] of t[url]e equilibrium payoffs from t[url]e subgame. Finally, we analyze a game in w[url]ic[url] a firm [url]as to decide w[url]et[url]er to invest in a mac[url]ine t[url]at will reduce its costs of production. We learn t[url]at t[url]e strategic effects of t[url]is decision - its effect on t[url]e c[url]oices of ot[url]er competing firms - can be large, and if we ignore t[url]em we will make mistakes. **Reading assignment:** Strategies and Games: T[url]eory And Practice. (Dutta): C[url]apter 13 Strategy: An Introduction to Game T[url]eory. (Watson): C[url]apter 16 **Resources:** ;[[[url]ttp://oyc.yale.edu/sites/default/files/blackboard19_0.pdf|Blackboard Notes Lecture 19 [PDF] ]] |
| 关 键 词: | 数学; 博弈论; 完美均衡 |
| 课程来源: | 视频讲座网 |
| 最后编审: | 2020-06-12：yumf |
| 阅读次数: | 87 |