图 书 馆
重复随机博弈的多项式时间纳什均衡算法A Polynomial-time Nash Equilibrium Algorithm for Repeated Stochastic Games |
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| 课程网址: | http://videolectures.net/uai08_munoz_aptnea/ |
| 主讲教师: | Enrique Munoz de Cote |
| 开课单位: | 米兰理工学院 |
| 开课时间: | 2008-07-30 |
| 课程语种: | 英语 |
| 中文简介: |  |
| 课程简介: | We present a polynomial-time algorithm that always finds an (approximate) Nash equilibrium for repeated two-player stochastic games. The algorithm exploits the folk theorem to derive a strategy profile that forms an equilibrium by buttressing mutually beneficial behavior with threats, where possible. One component of our algorithm efficiently searches for an approximation of the egalitarian point, the fairest pareto-efficient solution. The paper concludes by applying the algorithm to a set of grid games to illustrate typical solutions the algorithm finds. These solutions compare very favorably to those found by competing algorithms, resulting in strategies with higher social welfare, as well as guaranteed computational efficiency. |
| 关 键 词: | 数学; 博弈论; 人工智能 ; 计算机科学; 机器学习; 马尔可夫过程 |
| 课程来源: | 视频讲座网 |
| 最后编审: | 2020-09-28：heyf |
| 阅读次数: | 88 |