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核弹恐慌:核武器的历史和未来

Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons
课程网址: http://videolectures.net/mitworld_cirincione_weapons/  
主讲教师: Joseph Cirincione
开课单位: 犁头基金会
开课时间: 2013-06-14
课程语种: 英语
中文简介:
Joseph Cirincione就伊朗的核计划与伊朗的对峙提供了一个充满活力且有时充满激情的入门,部分来自他的最新着作“核武器的历史与未来”(哥伦比亚大学出版社,2007年春季)。他提供了一个简洁的方程式“描述驱动各国获取核武器的因素:3P TE,其中权力(安全),声望,政治(国内),技术和经济以各种方式结合起来,使一个国家加入核俱乐部。如果这些因素中的一个或多个可能以某种方式减弱 - 例如,通过经济或政治激励,或阻止裂变材料和技术的自由流动 - 那么核倾向国家可能会被说服改变方向。目前与伊朗的紧张局势将引发这样的司机生动地解脱了。 Cirincione首先指出,伊朗的核武器开发始于美国安装的Shah,他将成为我们的“海湾地区的宪兵”。他的计划得到了当今许多关键的美国政治人物的支持,包括副总统切尼。在1979年革命之后,伊朗领导人继续执行该计划,从巴基斯坦获得技术,以打击拥有自己的武器计划的伊拉克,并在80年代初侵入伊朗。 Cirincione说,在这场战争中有一百万伊朗人死亡,没有人帮助他们。 “伊朗人记得他们一个人。你必须了解历史才能理解为什么伊朗现在可能需要核武器。“但是,Cirincione假设伊朗没有在核发展方面走得太远,而且目前还没有秘密武器计划。虽然伊朗认为它有权获得核技术,但它不会承认其过去的武器工作。这将“打破他们的整个故事线,它反对伊斯兰教拥有核武器。”因此他们停止国际检查,并希望“通过混淆和拖延他们可以拖出问题,世界将默许他们的计划。”与伊朗坚持推进铀浓缩活动,有哪些选择? Cirincione瞄准目前的美国违约政策,“勉强糊口。”他还嘲笑伊朗政权更迭的想法,因为伊拉克教导“民主转型需要很长时间。”他为美国新保守派拯救了他最毒的倒钩。谁正在制定军事计划,以扫除伊朗。 “这很疯狂,”Cirincione表示,这是一种由“弥赛亚冲动”驱动的策略,他们认为“一个伟大的伊斯兰法西斯威胁。”伊朗可以通过关闭石油交通或袭击美国在伊拉克的军人来应对袭击;伊斯兰世界的愤怒“将使全世界的美国经济,政治和文化机构面临风险。”此外,伊朗人“会尽快踩到金属上以获得炸弹。”Cirincione说,另一种选择是遏制并参与:扩大对伊朗的严厉制裁,并在伊朗政治派别之间造成分裂。我们“将他们带回一个角落,然后给他们一条出路,”Cirincione说。 “谈判不是绥靖,他们是治国之道。我们应该与伊朗进行直接讨论。“
课程简介: Joseph Cirincione delivers an energetic and at times impassioned primer on the standoff with Iran on its nuclear program, drawn in part from his latest book, The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (Columbia University Press, Spring 2007). He offers a succinct ‘equation’ to describe what drives nations to acquire nuclear weapons: 3P+T+E, where power (security), prestige, politics (domestic), technology and economics combine in various ways to tip a nation toward joining the nuclear club. If one or more of these factors can be blunted somehow – for instance, through economic or political incentives, or preventing the free flow of fissile material and technology – then nuclear-inclined nations may be persuaded to change course. The current tense situation with Iran throws such drivers into vivid relief. Cirincione first notes that Iran’s nuclear weapons development began under the U.S.-installed Shah, who was to be our “gendarme in the Gulf.” His program had the backing of many of today’s key U.S. political figures, including Vice President Cheney. After the 1979 revolution, Iranian leaders continued the program, acquiring technology from Pakistan, to counter Iraq, which had its own weapons program, and which invaded Iran in the early 80s. One million Iranians died in this war, and no one came to their aid, says Cirincione. “Iranians remember they were alone. You have to understand history to understand why Iran may want nuclear weapons now.” But in a twist, Cirincione hypothesizes that Iran did not get far with its nuclear development and that it doesn’t currently have a secret weapons program. While Iran maintains it has the right to acquire nuclear technology, it won’t admit to its past weapons work. That would “blow their whole story line, that it’s against Islam to have nuclear weapons.” So they stall international inspections and hope “by obfuscation and delay they can drag out the issue, and the world will acquiesce to their plans.” With Iran insisting on moving ahead with uranium enrichment, what are the options? Cirincione takes aim at the current U.S. default policy, “to muddle through.” He also scoffs at the idea of regime change in Iran, since Iraq teaches that “democratic transformation takes a long time.” He saves his most poisonous barbs for U.S. neoconservatives, who are hatching military plans to sweep through Iran. “This is nuts,” says Cirincione, a strategy driven by people with “messianic impulses” who perceive “one great Islamo-fascist threat.” Iran could respond to attack by shutting down oil traffic, or attacking U.S. servicemen in Iraq; rage in the Islamic world “would put at risk American economic, political and cultural institutions worldwide.” Plus, Iranians “would go pedal to the metal to get a bomb as quickly as they could.” The alternative, says Cirincione, is to contain and engage: expand harsh sanctions against Iran and create fractures among Iranian political factions. We “back them into a corner, then give them a way out,” says Cirincione. “Negotiations aren’t appeasement, they’re statecraft. We should be having direct discussions with Iran.”
关 键 词: 核计划; 裂变材料; 新保守派
课程来源: 视频讲座网
最后编审: 2019-05-21:cwx
阅读次数: 63