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阿波罗:反思与教训

Apollo: Reflections and Lessons
课程网址: http://videolectures.net/mitworld_debate_apollo/  
主讲教师: Jeffrey Hoffman, Aaron Cohen, Joseph Gavin, Jr., Harrison H. Schmitt, Christopher C. Kraft Jr., Theodore Sorensen, Richard H. Battin
开课单位: 麻省理工学院
开课时间: 2013-03-15
课程语种: 英语
中文简介:
在为庆祝登月40周年举办的三场AeroAstro研讨会中的第一场,一群非凡的杰出人物讲述了他们在阿波罗计划中所扮演的角色,并庆祝麻省理工学院在让人类登上月球方面的独特作用。Theodore Sorensen认为总统肯尼迪选择他来监督美国对苏联首次太空飞行的反应,因为他是“一个怀疑论者......一位一神论者提出问题。”美国太空计划一直滞后,“与深夜电视漫画开玩笑”,所以肯尼迪政府认为只有“月球着陆的戏剧”才会刺激空间的改善。当肯尼迪向国会宣布这项计划时,反应是“令人难以置信”,所以他偏离了正式文本,提醒国会议员“我们所有人都将参加月球之旅。”今天,肯尼迪会因军事化而感到不安太空,索伦森相信。索伦森希望看到的下一个重大科学突破涉及“废除大规模杀伤性武器。”理查德·巴廷描述了由查尔斯“Doc”Draper领导的麻省理工学院仪器实验室于1957年在人造卫星发射后开发火星探测器的工作。 。该设备配备了太阳能电池板,推进器,带陀螺仪的姿态控制系统,以及设计用于在火星上进行三年往返的机载数字计算机。 NASA拒绝支持整个项目,但喜欢电脑。 1961年,美国宇航局局长吉姆韦伯要求他的好朋友“Doc”Draper为阿波罗开发导航和控制。 Battin认为这种关系,以及对一个有效的机载导航系统的需求(如果苏联人从地球上堵塞了通信链路)让MIT获得合同.Aaron Cohen记得火箭科学家Wernher Von Braun是如何被Cohen的Apollo任务困惑的,定义和解决阿波罗计划所有元素之间的接口。“他还描述了1967年1月发射台上发生的悲剧性火灾,导致三名机组人员遇难。这一集引发了数月的自我检查,导致了一个更安全的指挥服务模块,以及一系列导致登月的可靠航班。 “当我回顾阿波罗11号时,我会浏览每个子系统并惊叹于我们如何成功完成任务。”Joseph Gavin,Jr。在“Doc”Draper实验室开始研究生,但最终领导了月球模块,每次都在工作。我会再说一遍。它每次都有效。“他与该计划的长期联系给他留下了一些见解:没有随机失败的事情;一个人绝对不应该理所当然;并且不要改变任何有效的东西。他回忆起美国宇航局对加时赛的唠叨,但为他工作的年轻人承受着巨大的压力,所以加文推迟了,让“团体领导人照顾他们的人民。”哈里森“杰克”施密特带领观众了解他们的历史。阿波罗计划,包括他自己历史性的月球之旅。 “这还不错,在100万年的时间里留下足迹,可能是两百万年。”他认为,使命的成功关键包括拥有足够的技术基础和一批年轻的工程师和技术工人;由于冷战,人造卫星和导弹的差距,“全国不安的普遍环境”;一位有说服力的总统,他释放了足够的资金; “坚韧,称职和纪律严明的管理让人们做好自己的工作。”在飞行控制方面,小克里斯托弗•卡夫特说,“你必须驾驶你所拥有的东西。现在还没有时间停下来修理一些东西。“太空飞行早期的这个传说让我想起了黑猩猩的测试以及对人类适应零重力的担忧。当肯尼迪宣布月球任务时,“我以为他已经失去了理智。”作为飞行总监,卡夫突然“不得不提出前后来回月球的轨道力学。这对我来说是一个挑战。“卡夫目睹了整个国家支持阿波罗的努力,这使他相信”如果我们知道我们想做什么,我们在哪里,我们可以做我们在这个国家做的任何事情。“我希望能够完成任务。“
课程简介: In this first of three AeroAstro symposium events to mark the 40th anniversary of the moon landing, an extraordinary cast of luminaries recount the parts they played in the Apollo program, and celebrate MIT’s unique role in getting humans to the moon. Theodore Sorensen believes President Kennedy chose him to oversee the U.S. response to the Soviet’s first space flight because he was “a skeptic … a Unitarian raised asking questions.” The U.S. space program had been lagging, “a joke with late night TV comics,” so the Kennedy administration figured only the “the drama of a moon landing” would spur an improved space effort. When Kennedy announced the plan to Congress, the reaction was “stunned disbelief,” so he deviated from the official text, reminding congressmen that “all of us will be on that trip to the moon.” Today, Kennedy would be disturbed by the militarization of space, Sorensen believes. The next great scientific breakthrough Sorensen would like to see involves “the abolition of weapons of mass destruction.” Richard Battin describes the work of MIT’s Instrumentation Laboratory, headed by Charles “Doc” Draper, to develop a Mars probe in 1957 following the Sputnik launch. The device had solar panels, a thruster, an attitude control system with gyros, and an onboard digital computer designed to survive a three-year roundtrip to Mars. NASA declined to support the entire project, but liked the computer. In 1961, NASA chief Jim Webb asked his good friend “Doc” Draper to develop guidance navigation and control for Apollo. Battin believes this relationship, and the need for a functioning onboard navigation system (in case the Soviets jammed communication links from Earth) landed MIT the contract. Aaron Cohen remembers how rocket scientist Wernher Von Braun was puzzled by Cohen’s Apollo assignment, which was “to define and resolve interfaces between all elements of the Apollo program.” He also describes the tragic fire on the launch pad in January 1967, which killed three crew members. This episode triggered months of self-examination, leading to a safer command service module, and a series of reliable flights leading to the moon landing. “When I look back on Apollo 11, I go through each subsystem and marvel at how we managed to form the mission.” Joseph Gavin, Jr. started as a graduate student in “Doc” Draper’s lab, but ended up leading the development of the lunar module, which “worked every time. I’ll say that again. It worked every time.” His long association with the program left him with some insights: there’s no such thing as random failure; one should take absolutely nothing for granted; and do not change anything that works. He recalls NASA bugging him about overtime, but the young men working for him were under great pressure, so Gavin pushed back, allowing “group leaders to take care of their people.” Harrison “Jack” Schmitt takes the audience through the history of the Apollo program, including his own historic trip to the moon. “That’s not bad, leaving footprints in the sands of time for a million, might be two million years.” He believes the keys to the mission’s success included having a sufficient base of technology and a reservoir of young engineers and skilled workers; the “pervasive environment of national unease” due to the Cold War, Sputnik and the missile gap; a persuasive president who unleashed adequate funding; and “tough, competent and disciplined management to let people do their jobs.” In flight control, says Christopher Kraft, Jr., “you have to fly what you’ve got. There’s not time to stop and fix something.” This legend of the early days of space flight recalls chimpanzee testing and concerns about human adaptation to zero gravity. When Kennedy announced the moon mission, “I thought he’d lost his mind.” As flight director, Kraft suddenly “had to come up with the orbital mechanics of going back and forth to the moon. That to me was a hell of a challenge.” Kraft witnessed the entire nation get behind the Apollo effort, which convinced him “we could do anything we set our mind to in this country, if we know what we want to do, where we want to go and have the commitment to get it done.”
关 键 词: 登月; 太空计划; 月球着陆
课程来源: 视频讲座网
最后编审: 2019-05-21:cwx
阅读次数: 83