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第21讲重复游戏：合作与终结游戏Lecture 21 - Repeated games: cooperation vs. the end game |
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| 课程网址: | http://videolectures.net/yaleecon159f07_polak_lec21/ |
| 主讲教师: | Benjamin Polak |
| 开课单位: | 耶鲁大学 |
| 开课时间: | 2010-11-15 |
| 课程语种: | 英语 |
| 中文简介: |  我们讨论重复博弈，旨在揭示这样一种直觉，即在一段关系的未来，奖励的承诺和惩罚的威胁可以为今天的良好行为提供激励。在课堂上，我们玩了两次和三次囚徒困境，但这无法维持合作。问题是，到了最后一个阶段，既然有然后就有未来，就没有合作的动力，所以动力就从后面瓦解了。我们将此与跛脚鸭领导者的现实世界问题以及为接近退休的人维持激励措施联系起来。但是在一些重复博弈的早期阶段（即使它们只玩了几次），只要阶段博弈有两个或多个平衡作为奖励和惩罚，就有可能保持良好的行为。这可能需要我们明天打坏均衡。我们将此与法律中事前和事后效率之间的权衡联系起来。最后，我们玩了一个玩家不知道游戏何时结束的游戏，我们开始考虑这个可能无限重复的游戏的策略。 |
| 课程简介: | We discuss repeated games, aiming to unpack the intuition that the promise of rewards and the threat of punishment in the future of a relationship can provide incentives for good behavior today. In class, we play prisoners' dilemma twice and three times, but this fails to sustain cooperation. The problem is that, in the last stage, since there is then is future, there is no incentive to cooperate, and hence the incentives unravel from the back. We related this to the real-world problems of a lame duck leader and of maintaining incentives for those close to retirement. But it is possible to sustain good behavior in early stages of some repeated games (even if they are only played a few times) provided the stage games have two or more equilibria to be used as rewards and punishments. This may require us to play bad equilibria tomorrow. We relate this to the trade off between ex ante and ex post efficiency in the law. Finally, we play a game in which the players do not know when the game will end, and we start to consider strategies for this potentially infinitely repeated game. |
| 关 键 词: | 重复博弈; 阶段博弈; 无限重复 |
| 课程来源: | 视频讲座网 |
| 数据采集: | 2021-07-19：nkq |
| 最后编审: | 2021-07-19：nkq |
| 阅读次数: | 50 |