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第17讲-逆向归纳法：最后通牒和讨价还价Lecture 17 - Backward induction: ultimatums and bargaining |
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| 课程网址: | http://videolectures.net/yaleecon159f07_polak_lec17/ |
| 主讲教师: | Benjamin Polak |
| 开课单位: | 耶鲁大学 |
| 开课时间: | 2010-11-15 |
| 课程语种: | 英语 |
| 中文简介: |  我们开发了一个简单的讨价还价模型，从最后通牒博弈（一个人让另一个人接受或放弃报价）开始，逐渐发展到交替报价讨价还价（玩家可以提出还价）。在路上，我们引入了折扣：明天的一美元比今天的一美元更值钱。我们了解到，如果玩家同样耐心，如果报价可以快速连续，并且如果每一方都知道游戏对另一方的价值，那么第一个报价是平分馅饼，这个报价是公认。但这个结果取决于这些假设；例如，议价能力可能取决于财富。 |
| 课程简介: | We develop a simple model of bargaining, starting from an ultimatum game (one person makes the other a take it or leave it offer), and building up to alternating offer bargaining (where players can make counter-offers). On the way, we introduce discounting: a dollar tomorrow is worth less than a dollar today. We learn that, if players are equally patient, if offers can be in rapid succession, and if each side knows how much the game is worth to the other side, then the first offer is for an equal split of the pie and this offer is accepted. But this result depends on those assumptions; for example, bargaining power may depend on wealth. |
| 关 键 词: | 讨价还价模型; 通牒博弈; 议价能力 |
| 课程来源: | 视频讲座网 |
| 数据采集: | 2021-07-19：nkq |
| 最后编审: | 2021-07-19：nkq |
| 阅读次数: | 61 |