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第15讲-逆向归纳法：国际象棋、策略和可信威胁Lecture 15 - Backward induction: chess, strategies, and credible threats |
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| 课程网址: | http://videolectures.net/yaleecon159f07_polak_lec15/ |
| 主讲教师: | Benjamin Polak |
| 开课单位: | 耶鲁大学 |
| 开课时间: | 2010-11-15 |
| 课程语种: | 英语 |
| 中文简介: |  我们首先讨论 Zermelo 定理：像井字游戏或国际象棋这样的游戏有一个解决方案。也就是说，要么玩家 1 有办法强制获胜，要么玩家 1 有办法强制平局，要么玩家 2 有办法强制获胜。证明是归纳法。然后我们正式定义并非正式讨论此类博弈中的完美信息和策略。这使我们能够在连续博弈中找到纳什均衡。但是我们发现一些纳什均衡与反向归纳不一致。特别是，我们讨论了一个例子，该例子涉及一种相信处于均衡状态但似乎不可信的威胁。 |
| 课程简介: | We first discuss Zermelo's theorem: that games like tic-tac-toe or chess have a solution. That is, either there is a way for player 1 to force a win, or there is a way for player 1 to force a tie, or there is a way for player 2 to force a win. The proof is by induction. Then we formally define and informally discuss both perfect information and strategies in such games. This allows us to find Nash equilibria in sequential games. But we find that some Nash equilibria are inconsistent with backward induction. In particular, we discuss an example that involves a threat that is believed in an equilibrium but does not seem credible. |
| 关 键 词: | Zermelo 定理; 归纳法; 连续博弈 |
| 课程来源: | 视频讲座网 |
| 数据采集: | 2021-07-19：nkq |
| 最后编审: | 2021-07-19：nkq |
| 阅读次数: | 29 |