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第23讲-信息不对称：沉默、信号和痛苦教育Lecture 23 - Asymmetric information: silence, signaling and suffering education |
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| 课程网址: | http://videolectures.net/yaleecon159f07_polak_lec23/ |
| 主讲教师: | Benjamin Polak |
| 开课单位: | 耶鲁大学 |
| 开课时间: | 2010-11-15 |
| 课程语种: | 英语 |
| 中文简介: |  我们看两个信息不对称的设置；游戏的一方知道另一方不知道的事情。我们应该始终考虑到发出信号的人的动机来解释传达或发出此类信息的尝试。在第一种情况下，信息是可验证的。在这里，未能明确透露信息可能会提供信息，因此即使您不希望可验证的信息也会出现。我们考虑此类信息泄露的示例。然后我们转向无法验证的信息。在这里，即使您想传达此类信息也很难。然而，不同成本的信号有时可以激励具有不同信息的代理区分自己。我们特别考虑了教育系统如何让未来的工人表明他们的能力。我们讨论了这种相当悲观的教育观的一些含义。 |
| 课程简介: | We look at two settings with asymmetric information; one side of a game knows something that the other side does not. We should always interpret attempts to communicate or signal such information taking into account the incentives of the person doing the signaling. In the first setting, information is verifiable. Here, the failure explicitly to reveal information can be informative, and hence verifiable information tends to come out even when you don't want it to. We consider examples of such information unraveling. Then we move to unverifiable information. Here, it is hard to convey such information even if you want to. Nevertheless, differentially costly signals can sometimes provide incentives for agents with different information to distinguish themselves. In particular, we consider how the education system can allow future workers to signal their abilities. We discuss some implications of this rather pessimistic view of education. |
| 关 键 词: | 信息不对称; 沉默; 信号; 痛苦教育 |
| 课程来源: | 视频讲座网 |
| 数据采集: | 2021-07-19：nkq |
| 最后编审: | 2021-07-19：nkq |
| 阅读次数: | 44 |