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民主如何在困难的游戏中解决冲突

How Democracy Resolves Conflict in Difficult Games
课程网址: http://videolectures.net/mitworld_brams_drc/  
主讲教师: Steven Brams
开课单位: 纽约大学政治系
开课时间: 2014-01-12
课程语种: 英语
中文简介:
使用博弈论,并在圣经的帮助下,史蒂文布拉姆斯认为投票可以解决某些类型的冲突。 他详细探索了经典游戏“囚徒困境”。 在他的版本中,玩家必须选择是否为公园的改造做出贡献。 在游戏的两人变体中,布拉姆斯将富人视为一个玩家,而公众则是另一个玩家,“每个人都有搭便车的动机。” 他说,双方的主导策略不是贡献,而是让对方为公共利益买单。 然后布拉姆斯重新设计了这个游戏,增加了投票。 有两个人,多数意味着两个人都必须投票资助公园进行翻新。 为公园融资的一票不会削减它。 “通过允许投票决定结果,你可以从不合作变为合作作为主导策略,”布拉姆斯说。为了说明囚徒困境的多重或 N 人版本,布拉姆斯转向西奈山之后摩西的旧约故事。摩西带着十诫回来后,以色列人崇拜偶像,上帝威胁要摧毁它们。摩西要求以色列人在偶像崇拜和独一神之间做出选择。那些不委身于以色列上帝的人会被杀。在布拉姆斯看来,摩西在一种全民投票中赌了一把,多数人会按他的方式投票,“为了防止结果出现背叛,摩西认为有必要消灭那些选择(偶像崇拜)的人。”布拉姆斯说,“这是一种令人毛骨悚然的达成共识的方式,但在最近几乎无人知晓。” 布拉姆斯说,当游戏变成投票游戏时,合作结果就会呈现出新的状态。 “这个想法是,如果你没有足够的数量,没有人付钱,每个人都会受苦。如果你有足够的数量,每个人都付钱……你会得到合作的结果。没有中间的结果,有些人付钱,有些人不付钱,不付钱的人就像土匪一样。这就是投票的作用——它可以防止这种盗窃行为。” 在像美国这样的国家,当政府可以“可靠地承诺提供多数人支持的公共产品时,民主提供的解决方案是令人信服的”。但在犯罪或腐败盛行的情况下——例如,在一些发展中国家——必须保证大多数人支持的合作成果将真正得到落实,布拉姆斯说。
课程简介: Using game theory, and with some help from the Bible, Steven Brams argues that voting can resolve certain kinds of conflicts. He explores in detail the classic game Prisoner’s Dilemma. In his version, players must choose whether or not to contribute to the renovation of a public park. In a two-person variation of the game, in which Brams posits a rich person as one player, and the public as the other, “each person has an incentive to a free ride.” The dominant strategy for each, he says, is not to contribute, and let the other pay for the public good. Then Brams reframes this game, with the addition of voting. With two persons, a majority means both must vote to finance the park for the renovation to happen. One vote for financing the park won’t cut it. “You go from non-cooperative to cooperative as a dominant strategy, by allowing voting to determine the outcome,” says Brams. To illustrate a multiple, or N-person version of Prisoner’s Dilemma, Brams turns to the Old Testament story of Moses after Mount Sinai. Upon Moses’ return with the Ten Commandments, the Israelites are worshiping idols, and God threatens to destroy them. Moses asks the Israelites to choose between idolatry and the one God. Those who do not commit to the God of Israel are killed. In Brams’ view, Moses took a gamble in a kind of referendum that the majority would vote his way, and “to prevent defections from the outcome, Moses deemed it necessary that those who chose (idolatry) be decimated.” Says Brams, “This is a gruesome way to achieve consensus but hardly unknown in recent times.” When games become voting games, cooperative outcomes take on a new status, says Brams. “The idea is, if you don’t have a sufficient number, nobody pays, and everybody suffers. If you have a sufficient number, everybody pays…and you get the cooperative outcome. There aren’t in-between outcomes where some pay and some don’t, and the ones that don’t pay make out like bandits. That’s what voting does -- it prevents that banditry.” In countries like the U.S., when a government can “credibly commit to providing a public good that a majority supports, the solution that democracy provides is compelling.” But in situations where crime or corruption is the rule -- say, in some developing nations -- there must be assurances that the cooperative outcome the majority supports will really be implemented, says Brams.
关 键 词: 博弈论; 公共利益; 政治冲突; 民主选择
课程来源: 视频讲座网
数据采集: 2022-03-21:hqh
最后编审: 2022-03-21:hqh
阅读次数: 22