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社会地位与最优徽章设计

Social Status and the Design of Optimal Badges
课程网址: https://videolectures.net/videos/nipsworkshops2013_stoddard_desig...  
主讲教师: Greg Stoddard
开课单位: 信息不详。欢迎您在右侧留言补充。
开课时间: 2014-10-16
课程语种: 英语
中文简介:
许多网站依靠用户生成的内容为消费者提供价值。通常，这些网站通过根据用户的贡献授予用户徽章来激励用户生成的内容。这些徽章作为社会地位的象征，赋予用户价值。本文研究了以贡献最大化为目标的设计师徽章系统的优化设计。我们假设用户具有从共同先验中提取的异质能力，并选择对给定任务付出多少努力。用户的能力和努力选择决定了他对网站的贡献程度。如果用户的贡献超过预先指定的阈值，他将获得徽章。设计师面临的问题是如何设置徽章阈值来激励用户的贡献。我们的主要结果是，最佳总贡献可以用少量徽章很好地近似。具体来说，当徽章的数量与用户数量呈对数关系时，设计者可以产生的贡献至少是最佳无约束（非基于徽章）机制的一半。
课程简介: Many websites rely on user-generated content to provide value to consumers. Often these websites incentivize user-generated content by awarding users badges based on their contributions. These badges confer value upon users as a symbol of social status. In this paper, we study the optimal design of a system of badges for a designer whose goal is to maximize contributions. We assume users have heterogenous abilities drawn from a common prior and choose how much effort to exert towards a given task. A user’s ability and choice of effort determines the level of contribution he makes to the site. A user earns a badge if his contribution surpasses a pre-specified threshold. The problem facing the designer then is how to set badge thresholds to incentivize contributions from users. Our main result is that the optimal total contribution can be well-approximated with a small number of badges. Specifically, with a number of badges just logarithmic in the number of users, the designer can generate at least half as much contribution as the optimal unconstrained (non-badge-based) mechanism.
关 键 词: 消费者; 用户徽章; 社会地位
课程来源: 视频讲座网
数据采集: 2025-05-29：yuhongrui
最后编审: 2025-10-29：liyy
阅读次数: 21

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