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众包的适应性契约设计Adaptive Contract Design for Crowdsourcing |
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| 课程网址: | https://videolectures.net/videos/nipsworkshops2013_ho_crowdsourci... |
| 主讲教师: | Chien-Ju Ho |
| 开课单位: | 信息不详。欢迎您在右侧留言补充。 |
| 开课时间: | 2019-10-05 |
| 课程语种: | 英语 |
| 中文简介: |  |
| 课程简介: | Crowdsourcing markets have emerged as a popular platform for matching available workers with tasks to complete. The payment for a particular task is typically set by the task’s requester, and may be adjusted based on the quality of the completed work, for example, through the use of “bonus” pay- ments. In this paper, we study the requester’s problem of dynamically adjusting quality-contingent payments for tasks. We consider a multi-round version of the well-known principal-agent model, whereby in each round a worker makes a strategic choice of the effort level which is not directly observable by the requester. In particular, our formulation significantly generalizes the budget-free online task pricing problems studied in prior work. We treat this problem as a multi-armed bandit problem, with each “arm” representing a potential contract. To cope with the large (and in fact, infinite) number of arms, we propose a new algorithm, AgnosticZooming, which discretizes the contract space into a finite number of regions, effectively treating each region as a single arm. This discretization is adaptively refined, so that more promising regions of the contract space are eventually discretized more finely. We provide a full analysis of this algorithm, showing that it achieves regret sublinear in the time horizon and substantially improves over non-adaptive discretization (which is the only competing approach in the literature). |
| 关 键 词: | 众包市场; 动态调整; 战略选择 |
| 课程来源: | videolectures |
| 数据采集: | 2025-05-29：yuhongrui |
| 最后编审: | 2025-05-29：yuhongrui |
| 阅读次数: | 3 |