顺序游戏:道德风险,奖励和饥饿的狮子Lecture 13 - Sequential games: moral hazard, incentives, and hungry lions |
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课程网址: | http://videolectures.net/yaleecon159f07_polak_lec13/ |
主讲教师: | Benjamin Polak |
开课单位: | 耶鲁大学 |
开课时间: | 2010-11-15 |
课程语种: | 英语 |
中文简介: | 我们考虑玩家按顺序而不是同时移动的游戏,从涉及借款人和贷方的游戏开始。我们使用“向后归纳”来分析游戏。游戏具有道德风险:借款人不会偿还大笔贷款。我们讨论这种问题的可能补救措施。一种补救措施涉及激励设计:编写合同,使借款人有动力偿还。另一个涉及承诺战略;在这种情况下提供抵押品。我们考虑其他承诺策略,如燃烧船只。但当天的关键教训是反向归纳的想法。 |
课程简介: | We consider games in which players move sequentially rather than simultaneously, starting with a game involving a borrower and a lender. We analyze the game using "backward induction." The game features moral hazard: the borrower will not repay a large loan. We discuss possible remedies for this kind of problem. One remedy involves incentive design: writing contracts that give the borrower an incentive to repay. Another involves commitment strategies; in this case providing collateral. We consider other commitment strategies such as burning boats. But the key lesson of the day is the idea of backward induction. |
关 键 词: | 数学; 博弈论; 顺序游戏; 道德风险; 奖励; 饥饿的狮子 |
课程来源: | 视频讲座网 |
最后编审: | 2020-06-15:wuyq |
阅读次数: | 45 |