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逆向归纳:承诺,间谍,和先发优势Lecture 14 - Backward induction: commitment, spies, and first-mover advantages |
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| 课程网址: | http://videolectures.net/yaleecon159f07_polak_lec14/ |
| 主讲教师: | Benjamin Polak |
| 开课单位: | 耶鲁大学 |
| 开课时间: | 2010-11-15 |
| 课程语种: | 英语 |
| 中文简介: |  |
| 课程简介: | We first apply our big idea--backward induction--to analyze quantity competition between firms when play is sequential, the Stackelberg model. We do this twice: first using intuition and then using calculus. We learn that this game has a first-mover advantage, and that it comes commitment and from information in the game rather than the timing per se. We notice that in some games having more information can hurt you if other players know you will have that information and hence alter their behavior. Finally, we show that, contrary to myth, many games do not have first-mover advantages. |
| 关 键 词: | 逆向归纳; 承诺; 间谍; 先发优势 |
| 课程来源: | 视频讲座网 |
| 最后编审: | 2020-06-09：liqy |
| 阅读次数: | 26 |