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逆向归纳:象棋、策略、和可信的威胁Lecture 15 - Backward induction: chess, strategies, and credible threats |
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| 课程网址: | http://videolectures.net/yaleecon159f07_polak_lec15/ |
| 主讲教师: | Benjamin Polak |
| 开课单位: | 耶鲁大学 |
| 开课时间: | 2010-11-15 |
| 课程语种: | 英语 |
| 中文简介: |  |
| 课程简介: | We first discuss Zermelo's theorem: that games like tic-tac-toe or chess have a solution. That is, either there is a way for player 1 to force a win, or there is a way for player 1 to force a tie, or there is a way for player 2 to force a win. The proof is by induction. Then we formally define and informally discuss both perfect information and strategies in such games. This allows us to find Nash equilibria in sequential games. But we find that some Nash equilibria are inconsistent with backward induction. In particular, we discuss an example that involves a threat that is believed in an equilibrium but does not seem credible. |
| 关 键 词: | 逆向归纳; 象棋; 策略; 可信的威胁 |
| 课程来源: | 视频讲座网 |
| 最后编审: | 2020-06-09：liqy |
| 阅读次数: | 36 |